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The treatment of “class” as a notion has always beendiverse and controversial. And a consensus on itsdefinition has been up to now still lacking in the lit-
erature. The Marxian approach has emphasised economic
position and power as the criteria for distinguishing the
working class (proletariat) from the capitalist middle-class
(bourgeoisie), while the Weberian perspective has paired
the dual notions of “class” and “status groups” as the basis
for social stratification of people in society. By the Weber-
ian tradition, it is argued that “classes exist to the extent
that the groups share a common market condition as the de-
cisive basis for their specific life chances((1)”. Following such
an economic line of exposition about class, class may be
conceptualised as a proxy for similarity in the position
within the occupational system, especially in the context of
modern industrial (post-industrial) society((2). As pointed
out by Kocka, an economic class exists where individuals
share, due to a common economic position, latent inter-
ests((3). In a more explicit language, the class hierarchy is
perceived to help “differentiate positions within labour mar-
kets and production units or more specifically, to differenti-
ate such positions in terms of the employment relations that
they entail((4).” 
The market situation pertains to life chances as they stem
from the individual’s occupation, having consequences for
consumption level, household standard, children’s education
and other aspects of quality of life. Concomitantly, the work-
ing situation elucidates on how production is organised and
the location within the authority structure and the degree of
autonomy in performing work tasks((5). 
In light of the above conceptualisation of class, this article
aims to sketch a longitudinal profile on the evolution of a
This paper attempts to sketch a longitudinal profile on the evolution of a working class in  Hong Kong context in light of
the thesis of embourgeoisement. The increasing economic affluence in the 1980s and early 1990s appeared to have
bred an optimism in society that the members of the working class were converging in life-style and consumption
behaviour with the middle class in a process of embourgeoisement. However, the thesis of embourgeoisement comes
under question again around the turn of the millennium in the advent of globalisation and the successive waves of
recession that afflict Hong Kong. The vicissitudes of capitalistic competition, leading to business restructuring,
corporate down-sizing and other austerity prescriptions of labour cost-saving, popularise the practices of flexi-hiring,
atypical employment, outsourcing, labour shedding and retrenchment. The upshot of these austerity exercises has
been the re-casualisation of the labour market and the emasculation of the employment and income security of a
growing fringe of peripheral workers vulnerable to industrial deprivation and exploitation. As a consequence we now
see a new industrial proletariat or urban sub-class emerging in post-industrial Hong Kong. Its “embrace” as a hybrid
working class transcends a spectrum of blue-collar and service occupations. Because of the diversity in its
composition, the prospects for a solidaristic working class to emerge are again remote. And the role of the trade unions
in providing an effective leverage for uplifting and protecting their position is limited, as illustrated by the “impasse”
now still looming over the proposed enactments to prescribe a minimum wage level and standard work hours.
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working class in the Hong Kong context. The paper is struc-
tured in the following manner. In the first section, the theo-
retical underpinnings are presented. In the second section,
an attempt is made to elucidate the embourgeoisement of
the working class in a few decades of industrialisation after
the Second World War. This is followed by a section on the
increasingly diversified and deprived working class in the
post-industrial society of Hong Kong. Finally, we present
discussions and conclusions.The  working  class:  a  changingcomposit ion 
It has been commonplace to equate the manual blue-collar
workers in the lower tiers of the occupational hierarchy in so-
ciety with the working class. Such a treatment corresponds
to the class “divide” between production workers, agricul-
tural workers in primary production, semi-and unskilled man-
ual workers in industry, skilled manual workers plus lower-
grade technicians and supervisors of manual workers on one
hand and service workers, higher grade technicians, profes-
sionals, administrators, officials and managers on the
other((6). In short, the manual versus non-manual, or blue-col-
lar versus, white-collar dichotomy has often been invoked for
identifying the former as members of the “working class.”
Specifically, the working class is viewed to be composed of
those who supply labour, vis-à-vis those who provide serv-
ice((7). As exemplified by Goldthorpe: 
A labour contract entails a relatively short-term and specific
exchange of money for efforts. Employees supply more or
less discrete amounts of labour, under the supervision of the
employer or the employer’s agent, in return for wages that
are calculated on a “piece” or “time” basis. In contrast, a
service relationship entails a longer-term and more diffuse
exchange in which employees render service to their em-
ploying organisation in return for compensation that takes
the form not only of reward for work done, through a salary
and various perquisites, but also comprises important
prospective elements((8).
However, in spite of the mainstream position of the blue-
collar manual workers as the vanguard of the working class,
it is evident that as industrial societies move into post-indus-
trial late urbanism, the growing pervasiveness of the tertiary
service industries accompanied by the attrition of the man-
ufacturing sector has compounded the composition of the
working class, which has become increasingly diversified
and pluralistic. As lamented by Meikins, “the rise of global
capitalism, increasing capital mobility, the shift towards
‘flexible’ production, technological change, and a series of
other developments have transformed occupational struc-
ture and stimulated the developments of a variety of ‘new’
employment relationships((9).” The Marxian perspective
hence considers as problematic as well the once orthodox
definition of proletariat by limiting its scope to the “manual
industrial workers only in the pattern of nineteenth cen-
tury.” Such a definition needs widening in order to be real-
istic and compatible with “the present situation when man-
ual workers in traditional industry are sharply declining giv-
ing place to service workers and commercial workers includ-
ing part-time and casual workers((10).” Because of the sec-
toral re-distribution of employment to the tertiary from the
secondary sector in post-industrial societies, service workers
of lower status and lesser skills proliferate and are located
within the lower strata of the occupational structure. Exam-
ples are the sales workers, restaurant and catering workers,
transport workers, security guards and even clerks whose
jobs have become increasingly routine and de-skilled. Paral-
lel to the syndrome of shifts in the occupational structure
has been the re-casualisation of the labour market leading
to the proliferation of various flexi hiring practices and a
drift towards and expansion of atypical employment as in
the form of part-time employment, temporary and short-
term contract hiring, contingent worker arrangement, out-
sourcing to external agencies and subcontractors. These
workers on non-standard (non-regular) employment are pe-
ripheral and typically low paid, lacking in job security—al-
ways on the move but basically trapped in the secondary
sector of the labour market((11). Adding to this pool of the in-
dustrially marginal and deprived is a hybrid mix of foreign
guest workers, seasonal and migrant labour, as well as fe-
males and recent migrants (i.e. the ethnic minority) enter-
ing the employment market. 
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Evidently, such a complex constellation of workers of low
skill, status and pay stemming from the segmentation of the
labour force in post-industrial societies into “a permanent
core and a temporary periphery((12)” has to be reckoned as
members constituting the modern working class. In this con-
nection, the new paradigm of work and employment in post-
industrial societies warrants the revised interpretation of the
working class boundaries and composition to mirror its pres-
ent diversity and pluralistic nature, as the Marxian writers
concede: 
Considering all these facts and formulations, today’s manu-
facturing worker, skilled service sector workers, commercial
workers in the mercantile firms and financial institutions like
banks, insurances and the clerical and subordinate workers
in the service to the capitalists in the phenomenally ex-
panded government sectors, the scattered and individual
daily workers – all naturally come within the definition of
the wage-workers while the industrial wage-workers form the
core of the proletarian class((13).The  af f luent  worker  and embourgeoisement?
In spite of the heydays of the Hong Kong-Chinese labour
movement sustained by a solidaristic working class in the
1920s as manifested in the nostalgic episodes of industrial
strife and labour agitation (notably, the Seamen Strike of
1922 and the Hong Kong-Canton General Strike and Boy-
cott of 1925-26), it is argued that a home-grown class struc-
ture and a working class have not crystallised in post-war
Hong Kong because of its transient nature as a migrant so-
ciety swamped by a refugee population seeking asylum from
the mainland politico-social upheavals. Industrialisation
which commenced in the 1950s would have been conducive
to the gestation of a refractory working class consciousness
among the factory workers labouring under “sweat shop”
conditions; but such a propensity was nullified by the perva-
siveness of the refugee mentality—so that the labour unions
also became industrially docile. 
As Hong Kong’s industrial economy advanced into a higher
realm of sophistication in the 1980s, the Hong Kong worker
has also become more economically affluent. During the
compressed period of a few decades of industrialisation
Hong Kong had sustained an almost uninterrupted process
of continuous economic growth which became especially
conspicuous in the 1980s. For instance, the average annual
growth rate during the ten-year period between 1981 and
1991 registers a level of 4.5% a year. And Hong Kong
emerged as one of the more successful newly industrialised
economies (NIE) in East Asia. Gross domestic product
(GDP) rose by 5.5% in 1993. If adopting March 1982 as
the base period for measurement, the territory’s nominal
wage index advanced from 120.4 in 1984, to 136 in 1986,
210 in 1990, and 233 in 1991; while the real wage index
was correspondingly 87.2 in 1984, 104 in 1986, 115 in
1990, and 114 in 1990((14). Industrial wages level also esca-
lated in the manufacturing sector, yet at a pace slower than
in the service sector—possibly due to a more acute labour
shortage in the latter. Table 1 indicates the ascending trend
of the manufacturing real wage during the 1980s and table
1a presents a comparative profile of real wage movement
across the major sectors of the economy between the late
1980s and beginning of the 1990s. 
Table 1. Movement in the real wage index in
the manufacturing industry 
(June 1980 = 100)
12. Ibid., p. 32
13. Sen, Sukomal, op.cit.. 
14. Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Government , Hong Kong in Figures, Hong
Kong: Census and Statistics Department, 1985 edition and 1992 edition. 
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Concomitantly, since the 1980s there has been a slow yet
steady narrowing of the income differentials between the
white-collar workers. As illustrated by Turner and his associ-
ates from their study, such differentials have declined from
nearly two-thirds in 1976 to less than one-fifth in 1985((15).
However, the Gini coefficient has been staggering on an up-
ward trend, increasing from 0.43 in the mid 1970s to 0.46
by the mid 1980((16). The trend was literally reversed in 1986
when the coefficient dropped to 0.455. Yet, in the early
1990s it resumed its rising trend again and ascended to
0.48((17). Such a movement suggests persisting and even
worsening equality in the distribution of income among peo-
ple in society. 
Although Hong Kong continued to pale as a place of un-
even income and wealth distribution, there were visible im-
provements in the materialistic provisions and standard of liv-
ing (and by extension, quality of working life) among mem-
bers in the industrial working class during the 1980s and
early 1990s because of the uplift in their wage and earning
levels—attributable probably to not only their intrinsic pro-
ductivity advances (made possible by their skill betterment
and capital investment in plant and machinery)((18) but also a
creeping drift towards scarcity of supply in the labour mar-
ket. The maturing demographic structure of Hong Kong so-
ciety has implied a slow-down in the natural growth of the
domestic population. This factor, together with the strenu-
ous control upon illegal immigrants at the border by both the
Chinese and Hong Kong authorities, has made the internal
growth of the labour force relatively stagnant and incommen-
surate with the strong manpower demand in industry ema-
nating from a buoyant economy, especially in the export,
and later, the tertiary service sectors. The entire labour
shortage syndrome hence worked to push up wage levels as
employers’ mutual bidding for skills and manpower intensi-
fied. It also caused the economy to re-structure in an attri-
tion process of de-industrialisation inasmuch as it induced
Hong Kong’s manufacturing plants to re-locate across the
border northwards in lower cost areas in southern China. 
Besides the wage nexus, there were also other factors con-
tributing to the growing economic affluence of the Hong
Kong workers. First, the “social wages” provided by the gov-
ernment, as in the form of public housing, free or inexpen-
sive medical care and hospital services and availability of
universal education for at least ten years and expanded ter-
tiary level education which helped enhance the life chances
(especially for upward inter-generational mobility) of chil-
dren for working class parents—alongside the consistent and
cheap supply of raw food and light consumer goods from
mainland China—became a sizable or even a major subsidy
to their take-home income and earnings. Second, there was
an evident phenomenon of convergence in life-style and con-
sumption behaviour of blue-collar workers and their families
with their white-collar counterparts. In particular, the China
Product Emporium Stores excelled around this period in
selling inexpensive necessities and consumer goods to the
grassroots labouring masses((19). These stores established
large branches in densely populated districts “to give easy
access to people from the grassroots level; they also serve…
as de facto collecting points for working class shoppers to
purchase in bulk low-cost merchandise to be taken back to
Table 1a. Movements of wage indices by
selected economic sector (September 1987
to September 1991)
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their Mainland relatives((20).” Hence, improvements in wage
conditions at the grass-roots level made it possible for the
labouring masses to assume a more consumption-oriented
lifestyle, in place of the austerity ethos which pervaded their
poverty-ridden refugee psychology in the fifties and six-
ties.((21) Given their elevation in economic affluence, they
also began to patronise the department stores for trendy con-
sumer goods. Third, Hong Kong society has grown increas-
ingly permissive to upward social mobility from the lower
strata, both intra-generational as well as inter-generational.
There existed a proliferation of success stories about self-
made and home-grown entrepreneurs, based upon their
petty capital derived from accumulated savings—made possi-
ble because of their thrift and the inexpensive rental paid for
public housing and the cheap wet food supplied by the
motherland((22). As demonstrated by a 1985 study by Turner
and his associates, the proportion of Hong Kong workers ex-
pressing a hope to start a business was substantially higher
than found in a comparable study ten years ago((23). There
was also a preponderant share of the worker sample, 88%
who articulated an expectation for an upward occupational
movement of their posterity vis-à-vis their present position.
And almost every worker interviewed was prepared to spon-
sor their children financially for completing university educa-
tion or obtaining a professional qualification((24). Fourth, in
the labour market and domain of personnel hiring, there had
been an evident trend of a decasualisation of the blue-collar
labour force((25), an upgrading in skills and productivity (stan-
dards) of lower-skilled employees and a lengthening of the
work period for which wages were paid, suggesting hence a
significant stabilisation in workers’ attachment and employ-
ment security at enterprises((26). Concomitantly, there had
also been a creeping and yet steady narrowing of the income
differentials between manual blue-collar workers and white-
collar employees((27). 
All these developments—the uplifting in status, aspirations
and life-style of the industrial blue-collars—and their growing
economic affluence hence serve as a pointer to their conver-
gence with the middle class or “central class”. They lend ev-
idence, prima facia, to the thesis of embourgeoisement of
the working class, which suggests that the working class has
become increasingly assimilated into the middle class and is
in an attrition process of withering away and being drained
of its traditional class consciousness and solidarity((28). 
However, the thesis of embourgeoisement comes under
question around the turn of the millennium in the advents of
globalisation and successive waves of recession, as the fol-
lowing shows.
Re-emergence of  an impover -ished and diversif i ed  workingclass :  industr ia l  deprivationand pauper isat ion in  thelabour market  of  a post- indus-tr ia l  soci ety?
Hong Kong’s labour force has been haunted by creeping
problems of redundancies and unemployment since the be-
ginning of the 1990s. The predicament began because lo-
cally based factories moved northwards across the border in
large numbers in search for cheaper labour and land in the
mainland (as a low-cost “hinterland”). The migration en
masse of Hong Kong-based production plants, pushed away
due to the spiralling pressures of acute land and labour
shortages as well as escalating production costs, led to a dra-
matic “withering away” of Hong Kong’s manufacturing sec-
tor. This de-industrialisation process, which began in the
mid-1980s, has drastically curtailed the size (in both ab-
solute and relative terms) of Hong Kong’s industrial em-
ployment—the bastion of the traditional working class. At
the same time, Hong Kong rediscovered its commercial
role in the 1990s by resuming its modern business and fi-
nancial centre. In this re-commercialisation process, it at-
tempts to excel in the provision of high value-adding service
activities, placing a premium on technology, modern hard-
ware, and human resource quality. As Hong Kong ad-
vances and diversifies its core tertiary activities into real es-
tate property development, retail sales, tourism, hotel and
catering and associated hospitality trades as well as new
areas such as container port handling and trucking, air
cargo transport, banking and financial services and telecom-
munications, a variety of white-collar professional, manage-
72 N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
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rial and service occupations, both new and established, pro-
liferate and expand in size. 
The relocation of Hong Kong’s manufacturing industry has
inevitably made thousands of industrial blue-collar workers
redundant. Mostly middle-aged craftsmen and semi-skilled
production workers, these affluent workers of yesterday have
experienced almost insurmountable difficulties in transfer-
ring to other trades. Retraining in new skills was advanced
by the government as a logical prescription to assist these
workers in their career movement and transfer. However, be-
cause of their age constraints many of them were hard-core
“unemployable” not amenable to retraining and re-skilling.
They were either trapped in the industrial “unemployed
army” or forced to move downward but laterally to lower-sta-
tus peripheral callings in the service sector to work as secu-
rity guards, dustmen or petrol station attendants. 
In retrospect, unemployment and employment have afflicted
Hong Kong for more than a decade since the early 1990s,
especially when the economy was beset by a succession of
cyclical downturns shortly after the inception of the SAR.
These problems of unemployment and redundancies which
plagued Hong Kong’s labour and society were partly due to
the vicissitudes of economic adversity in periods of downturn
and partly because of, as noted above, the restructuring of
the economy, which gave rise to structural imbalances of sec-
toral employment and skills mix in the labour market glutted
by labour surplus in the sunset industries. Looking back, the
waves of economic adversity hit Hong Kong three times dur-
ing the nine years since the SAR was inaugurated when
business closures and corporate restructuring (notably,
alongside exercises of downsizing and de-layering) to sustain
firms’ survival and competitiveness were on the upsurge.
The first episode emanated from the East Asian financial-
cum-currency crisis in 1997. The second followed the Amer-
ican-led global recession in the wake of the collapse of the
“new economy” (a euphoria about cybetics technology)
bubble and the 11 September episode of 2001. The third
was caused by the SARS epidemic of 2003. In the advents
of these crises, unemployment intensified and escalated. At
its peak, unemployment affected and impeded almost every
sector of the Hong Kong economy across-the-board. Those
who were particularly vulnerable were located not only in
the manufacturing production industry but also in the serv-
ice sector including the distributive trades of wholesale and
retail services, catering, building and construction, property
agency services, as well as transport and financial servicing.
Added to this was a creeping phenomenon that “the effects
of corporate downsizing and lay-offs spread to the upper seg-
ment of the occupational hierarchy((29)”, as evident in visible
increases in the unemployment rates for the more elitist
groups of managers and administrators, and professionals in
the upper echelon. The plight of unemployment was no
longer limited to the blue-collar workforce at the grass-roots
level. In Marxian language, the unemployed industrial army
among the working class was replenished from those hived
off from white-collar occupations and service industries, in
addition to those production workers displaced earlier from
the de-industrialisation syndrome. 
Still, working people at the grass-roots levels were most vul-
nerable and anxious about perils of unemployment, in both
the service and production sectors. Against an environment
beset by a sustained deflation spiral, the plight of “glut” be-
came conspicuous almost everywhere across a spectrum of
industries in causing a vicious cycle for the feeble economy
and labour market. The doldrums and pessimistic business
prospects caused firms to consolidate their activities and
downsize, and even levy pay cuts as a follow-on. The sub-
sequent linkage effects of people’s curtailed income and
ability to spend and consume, in turn, sustained a persist-
ing recession in the consumption oriented industries—
which were income sensitive—such as retail, restaurants
and catering, leisure industries and even the real estate
property sector. 
The modern working class in post-industrial Hong Kong
emerges again with sharper contours, when their members
now become visibly disadvantaged, impoverished and pro-
letarianised. Their resurgence is to a large extent an out-
growth of cyclical recession as well as “globalisation.”
Globalised competition, alongside its elitist ethos of indi-
vidualised excellence at the expense of the less able and
less competent, has been to polarise and widen the wealth
and income gap between those who “have” and those who
“have not,” between the “able” and “less able.” Such a
trend of increasingly unequal distribution of income within
Hong Kong society is symptomatic, in the consistent up-
ward drift of the Gini coefficient since the 1990s. It as-
cended, for example, from 0.476 in 1991 to 0.518 in 1996
and further to 0.525 in 2001((30) (see tables 2 and 3). Ear-
lier, the dislocation of the mid-career industrial workers dis-
placed from manufacturing production works and the
weak labour market position of recent Chinese immi-
73N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
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grants from the mainland, alongside a growing army of
foreign guest workers, together constituted a potential
breeding ground for an urban sub-class of the industri-
ally deprived and economically fragile. Often isolated
and solitary, socially marginalised and inarticulate,
these workers lack both the consciousness and ability to
organise themselves into trade unions for the collective
representation of their interests. Their predicament sug-
gests a new industrial proletariat, trapped in the second-
ary layer of the Hong Kong labour market((31), who are
“however, increasingly marginalised” because of “their
labour market vulnerability” and the relative ineffective-
ness of their own collective organised power in defend-
ing their job interests((32). 
Later, adding to their ranks and compounding the hybrid
composition of this modern working class are those located
at the periphery of the labour market because of i) re-casu-
alisation of the labour market; ii) unemployment stemming
from the post-1997 waves of recession, and iii) the “sweat-
ing” conditions of excessive long hours and depressant low
pay in a number of service trades. 
A casual labour market has again emerged–largely as a se-
quel to the popularisation of flexi-hiring practices as a pre-
scription of modern human resource management to ad-
vance the adaptability and competitive ability of a firm. Such
practices, while helping businesses to save on labour over-
heads, marginalise and push into “atypical employment” the
non-regular labouring people such as the part-timers, tempo-
rary hires, those on fixed short term contracts (seasonal
workers) as well as those converted into self-unemployed on
“outsourcing” arrangements vis-à-vis their former employing
organisations((33). Typically, they are low paid and living on
meagre incomes and as such, are deprived of any employ-
ment and income security, and of the protection of the law
(notably, the Employment Ordinance prescribing a statutory
floor of employment rights for their regular counterparts
hired on a continuous contract). And Hong Kong trade
unions typically find organisation in their domain tricky, and
the reason is three-fold: the large number of peripheral work-
ers with low awareness about the trade unions; they are
widely dispersed and always mobile without any locational
stability; and they have little marketable skill and thus little
strength in the labour market, which hardly sustains an effec-
tive bargaining position vis-à-vis their employers((34).
Industrial docility in the urban subclass of the peripherals
has been sustained and accentuated in the SAR because of
shifts and further depression in the bulging labour market,
now emanating from the epidemic of business closures and
corporate downsizing. The ranks of the unemployed indus-
trial army were increasingly replenished from the main-
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31. Ng Sek Hong, “Labour and Employment”, in Joseph Y. S. Cheng and Sonny S. H. Lo
(eds.), From Colony to SAR: Hong Kong’s Challenges Ahead, 1995, pp. 197-225.
32. Ibid., pp. 203-4, 220. 
33. In addition, the enterprise as the principal may externalise and farm out its non-core
tasks to subcontracting or outsourcing agencies which in turn are employers of either ca-
sual or regular workers?as practised in such areas of “secondary” service work like
cleaning, car-park management and security work. This form of casualisation and em-
ployment of indirect labour, virtually reminiscent of the factory system in Victorian Britain,
has been found conducive to low pay because of the subcontractor’s endeavours to
squeeze on labour costs in the competitive bidding for the “outsourcing” assignment.
34. The exceptions are probably, however, in the stevedoring and container port trades,
where lorry drivers hired off from regular employment and now retained mostly on the
basis of a contract for services are known to have organised themselves into solidaris-
tic, effective and powerful labour unions.
Table 2. Gini coefficient of Hong Kong
Table 3. Gini coefficient of selected 
developed economies
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stream divisions of the general labour force. As earlier
noted, these affected (and afflicted) employees now include
managerial and professional personnel; sales and clerical
workers, as well as other white-collar, grey-collar (techni-
cians) and blue-collar workers.
A key feature of the modern working class, however, is the
syndrome of low pay and lengthy work hours besetting a di-
versity of service trades in the lower tier of the occupational
structure, especially those associated with atypical employ-
ment. As noted above, there has been a creeping phenome-
non of “atypical employment,” including non-regular hiring
under part-time, temporary, and short-term contractual provi-
sions, which has contributed to the low-wage syndrome. To
explain, both the recession waves and the pressure of global
competition induce Hong Kong enterprises to restructure
their business activities and workplace arrangements, in
order to cut costs as well as enhance their resource-based
competency. These restructuring levers were modelled ex-
tensively, as a common austerity drive among enterprises,
along Western lines of de-layering, outsourcing, de-establish-
ment and down-sizing.
This syndrome of growing atypical employment helps to ex-
plain the low-wage phenomenon in the context of restructur-
ing the Hong Kong labour market and its propensity for reg-
ulatory institutions such as minimum-wage regulation. The
official statistics published by the Census and Statistics De-
partment suggests an association of this new category of em-
ployment status with low wages among employees in Hong
Kong. An estimate by the Census and Statistics Department
in 1999 put the size of the part-time workforce at 116,000
or 4.1% of the employed labour force. This number repre-
sents a sizeable advance from the earlier statistics of 82,000
part-time workers (or 2.8% of the general waged labour
force) recorded by the government for the fourth quarter of
1997. Part-time working as a common form of atypical em-
ployment advanced and expanded rapidly within a short in-
terval as a result.
The fringe nature of these part-time workers as a peripheral
segment of the general labour force was evident. As illus-
trated by the official survey, these part-time labourers were
likely to be female and married persons in the middle-age
braches. A sizeable proportion of them were also house-
wives, as hinted at by about one-fifth of the respondents
(20.8%) who cited “attention required for housework” as an
explanation for their part-time work status. The largest em-
ployer of these marginal labouring groups was the hybrid
service sector of “wholesale, retail, and import/export
trades, restaurants and hotels” which engaged about 27% of
the whole part-time population. Low wages also appeared: a
significant fraction (16.9%) earned less than HK$2,000 a
month, and as high as 71.5% reported monthly earnings of
less than HK$6,000 derived from their main employment.
Unskilled and skilled marginality were also a common prob-
lem among these workers, of whom one-third (33.2%) were
in occupations graded as elementary in skill status, with an-
other one-fiftieth (19.3%) belonging to the general skill cat-
egory of service workers and shop assistants((35).
This labour market syndrome of low wages and atypical em-
ployment helps to demonstrate again a core phenomenon in
Hong Kong’s business restructuring exercises. The populari-
sation of flexibility in employment has prompted the relatively
low paying industries, especially service industries, to “casu-
alise” (or re-casualise) their workforce to save on labour costs
and associated overheads. Apparently, the part-time work
hour norm also appealing to employers concealing low wages
as pay becomes fractionalised and denominated on an hourly
basis. As earlier reported in the mass media, this syndrome
of depressant wage levels has become probably common in
some restaurants and fast-food stores because of the persist-
ent glut in labour supply at the low skill levels((36).
Moreover, outsourcing of non-core work activities by corpo-
rate employers has helped nurture a “low pay” syndrome.
A vicious circle is always perpetuated as competitive bid-
ding for contract tender among subcontractors tends to
prompt the latter to hire workers on low pay in order to
save on labour costs. Such vicissitudes of outsource sub-
contracting leading to a “low wage” squeeze are known to
be practiced widely in the cleaning trade and among
providers of security guard services who are also afflicted
by excessive long work hours((37). The depressing working
conditions arising from outsourcing arrangements among
these service industries have been heavily castigated by or-
ganised labour, which has articulated a strong demand for
government to introduce a protective minimum wage law to
ensure that the pay of these peripheral workers cannot fall
below a stipulated statutory floor. It is likely that these pe-
ripheral workers will continue to be trapped in this disad-
vantaged position and industrial deprivation of the modern
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35. Census and Statistics Department, Social Data collected via the General Household Sur-
vey, Part-time Employment, Special Topics Report n° 24, Hong Kong: Printing Depart-
ment, 1999.
36. Ng Sek Hong and Poon, Carolyn Y. W., Business Restructuring in Hong Kong: Strengths
and Limits of Post-Industrial Capitalism, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 2004.
37. The Workplace Study Group, The Chinese Management Centre, A Report on the Survey
of Employment and Working Conditions of Security Personnel in the Property Manage-
ment Industry, Hong Kong, The University of Hong Kong, August 2002. 
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working class of late urbanism in post-industrial Hong
Kong. 
The Hong Kong working class and its labour movement did
not lack a nostalgic history of its early-day agitation in protest
against employers and capital. In retrospect, there are three
identifiable waves of an upsurge in the working class move-
ment in Hong Kong. These are: its embryonic yet euphoric
heydays during the pre-war era of the 1920s, and later the
rehabilitation years following immediately the Second World
War; the post-war industrialisation period; and the current
post-industrialisation period after the 1990s.
In its earlier stages, noticeably in the period before and after
the Second World War, the working class phenomenon was
very distinctive of its blue-collar characteristics. This is evi-
denced by the successful Seamen’s Strike of 1922 and the
1925-26 Hong Kong Canton (Guangzhou) General Strike
and Boycott which marked the prelude to an era of bitter
and prolonged political strife between the Nationalist Party
and Chinese Communist Party that was to dictate the
course of contemporary Chinese politico-labour history((38).
After experiencing a post-war period of fairly intensive in-
dustrial haggling and strife in the late 1940s and early
1950s, Hong Kong entered a period of relative industrial
peace and stability which coincided with its process of eco-
nomic take-off and industrialisation((39). Although lacking a
strong vestige of class tradition, Hong Kong had an enor-
mous oversupply of industrial production (or blue collar)
workers. Objectively speaking, these production workers en-
gaged in the industrial secondary sector were potential mem-
bers of the territory’s working class, given the widespread vi-
cissitudes of their industrial drudgery, economic pauperisa-
tion and terrible working and employment conditions, and
thus the deprived quality of working life as vividly docu-
mented by England and Rear((40). However, whatever mutual
feelings of working class alienation, deprivation and anti-cap-
ital consciousness they might have shared as “refractory”
labour were swamped by their effacing and lukewarm orien-
tation towards workplace collectivism and concerted articula-
tion of industrial agitation and militancy. Instead, what pre-
vailed was a scarcity of employment opportunities, an anxi-
ety for trouble aversion and a preference for industrial docil-
ity—all purportedly bred of their “refugee” character and
mentality.
In its current third wave of gestation, the working class also
looks docile and incapable of articulating a strong class iden-
tity and interest. We would argue that the diversity of its
composition as a hybrid mix of low-skill service workers and
the fluidity of the nature of employment have not been con-
ducive to the nurturing and consolidation of a new working
class consciousness and solidarity among their ranks. In par-
ticular, workers labouring in diverse categories of atypical
employment have not been amenable to organisation by
trade unions because of the transient nature of their employ-
ment and hence the inherent lack of stable attachment to the
workplace. Even the role of the trade unions in representing
and articulating the occupational interest of these working
people at the grass-roots level has been limited, and lacking
any signs of militancy as a refractory labouring mass. The
labour movement’s vociferous lobby on the SAR govern-
ment to enact a minimum wage law and to regulate standard
work hours for protecting marginal workers has so far been
perfunctory as the legislative motions are still in an “im-
passe”. The SAR government, adhering to its doctrinal faith
in a “free” labour and wage market as a Hong Kong ethos
and anxious not to antagonise business and capital, averted
the painstaking policy decision of introducing legislation to
prescribe a minimum wage level and govern work hours for
the working population. Instead, it devolved a power of self-
regulation to both sides of industry within the low pay sec-
tor. The government launched an essentially voluntaristic ex-
76 N o  2 0 0 7 / 2
38. Chesneaux, Jean, The Chinese Labor Movement 1919-1927, Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1968, pp. 312-18, 332-34; also Wales, Nyum, The Chinese Labor Movement,
Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1945. 
39. This post-war industrialisation process was Hong Kong’s first experience of economic
restructuring, made possible by the massive inflow of refugee Chinese capital alongside
the industrial know-how and technical manpower and an influx of cheap unskilled
/semi-skilled labour brought to Hong Kong by people seeking asylum after the liberation
of the mainland in 1949. The swift conversion of the territory into an industrial economy
was also partly caused by its “de-commercialisation” Hong Kong’s traditional mix of
commercial and mercantile activities began to recede as China entered a period of po-
litical turmoil because of the civil war. This de-commercialisation process was further
accelerated by the trade embargo levied upon China by the United Nations during the
1950s in the aftermath of the Korean War. Trade sanctions almost halted the previously
huge flow of goods between the mainland and the rest of the world that was handled
through Hong Kong’s port. See Cheung, Grace H. Y. Ho, Elaine Y. Y., Ng, Sek Hong and
Poon, Carolyn Y. W., “Business Restructuring in Hong Kong”, in David G. Lethbridge and
Ng Sek Hong (eds.), The Business Environment in Hong Kong, 4th edition, Hong Kong,
Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 154-84. 
40. Hong Kong workers in the late 1960s and early 1970s were labouring for low wages yet
with long working hours. They performed the longest working day and the longest work-
ing week vis-à-vis their counterparts in other South-East Asian cities. A survey of reset-
tlement estate (public housing estate) residents carried out by the Sociology Department
of the University of Hong Kong revealed that the majority of the heads of households had
to work all Saturdays and Sundays. “Only 12 per cent worked 8 hours or less per day
and 42 percent worked 11 hours or more each day”. See Hopkins, Keith, “Housing the
Poor”, in Keith Hopkins (ed.), Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony, Hong Kong, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1971. The average income they earned was a meagre amount of HK$332
(about £22) a month. In a study of shop workers Chaney in 1969, half of the subjects
were found to work 12 hours or more a day and over 80% worked seven days a week.
“It appeared that the majority of shopworkers spent practically all their waking hours at
work”. See Chaney, D. C., “Levels of Emotional Strain in South-East Asian Cities”, un-
published manuscript, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1971. England and Rear de-
scribed the vicissitudes of such inhospitable working conditions as “sweat labour”. See
England, Joe and Rear, John, Chinese Labour under British Rule, Hong Kong, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1975.
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ercise, a “Wage Protection Movement” for employees in the
two industries notorious for low wages—the cleaning and se-
curity services sector. And the administration is equally luke-
warm about enhancing the Employment Ordinance in order
to bestow upon the part-time employees and other workers
engaged in atypical employment a statutory floor of employ-
ment rights analogous to those now available for their full-
time counterparts.
The working class, incapable of self organisation and of mo-
bilising a collectivistic movement to campaign for better-
ment, has been looking to the government for leverage to lift
its deprived members from the “doldrums” they are in.
However, these prospects are not sufficient to prompt opti-
mism since the SAR government, anxious to perform its
agency role to work for Hong Kong’s prosperity and stabil-
ity, continues to rope dance between capital in business and
the industrially peripheral among the working class.•
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